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Abstract: This article argues that new media technologies are likely to elicit 
changes in the content, tone, and potential electoral impact of those campaign 
messages micro-targeted through them, with a resulting increase in the level of 
unaccountable, deceptive, pseudonymous campaigning. Access to data-mined 
information will increase the likelihood that the candidate with the larger war-
chest will gain an advantage by changing the composition of the electorate. In 
a world of micro-targeted messaging, reporters have greater difficulty holding 
sponsors accountable and policing deception.
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The “analytics-based tactical optimization” that David Karpf ties to the “culture of 
testing” does indeed warrant his conclusion that “We are potentially moving from 
swing states to swing individuals, employing savvy marketing professionals to attract 
these persuadables and mobilize these supporters with little semblance of the slow, 
messy deliberative practices enshrined in our democratic theories.” What is missing 
from his précis of the nature and possible impact of new media technologies on poli-
tics, however, is a discussion of their effects on the content, tone, and potential elec-
toral impact of the resulting messages. Absent as well is consideration of the role 
money plays in securing access to these new tactics and culture and of the ways in 
which imbalances in the funding of opposing campaigns can, as a result, affect elec-
tion outcomes by giving one side a mobilizing and messaging edge over the other. 
Such advantages matter because, as Kenski, Hardy, and Jamieson (2010) confirmed 
in 2008, micro-targeting and imbalances in spending can shift vote preference.
Some of the results of the marriage of money and new media technology are 
desirable, others less so. Individualized messaging can, for example, be used to 
ensure that a voter receives an absentee ballot, knows where her polling place 
is, or is reminded to vote. Because inter-personal appeals increase the likelihood 
of voting (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Green and Gerber 2008), mobilizing 
messages can affect the proportion of the total ballots cast by supportive groups 
(in Obama’s case in 2008 and 2012, Hispanics and Blacks). Additionally, micro-
targeting makes it possible to mobilize one’s own supporters without activating 
those who would cast their vote for the other side.
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Importantly, the campaign with more money will have a net electoral advan-
tage as a result. Since turnout efforts have their greatest effect with low propen-
sity voters in high-intensity elections and high propensity voters in low intensity 
ones (Arceneaux and Nickerson 2009), we can also predict the groups most sus-
ceptible to mobilization efforts in this new venue. Just as targeted messages can 
inform a voter about civic matters, they also can be used to misdirect and deceive. 
One does not need to work hard to imagine how individualized messages carried 
through the new technologies could be used to suppress the vote in ways unlikely 
to be detected by election officials or vigilant reporters.
On the positive sign of the ledger, the capacity to tie tailored messaging to 
specific target voters can increase the amount of issue and biographically-based 
information that campaigns communicate. Such messages are, of course, selec-
tive. A pro-life union member in an Ohio or Michigan household will not be told 
that Obama is pro-choice but rather that he championed and Romney opposed 
the auto bailout. Nothing is new there. What is new is the ability to convey mes-
sages, both problematic and benign, without risking scrutiny and correction by 
reporters or scholars. Lack of critical analysis is especially problematic when 
such messages are pseudonymous, deceptive, un-rebutted attacks.
Because micro-targeted communication delivers “impressions” more effi-
ciently and with less risk of backlash from unintended viewers than does mass 
mediated content, it is reasonable to conclude that in coming elections third party 
and campaign advertisers will shift more of their resources to these new technol-
ogy channels. The reasons are straight forward. The mass media are an inefficient 
way to reach the swing voters who decide how a state will cast its electoral votes 
and viewer-use of remote controls and DVRs escalates the “cost per impression” 
of mass media advertising even further (Prior 2007).
Just as candidate messaging increasingly will appear on line so too will that 
by third party groups. Where these agents played only a minor role in 2008, in 
the 2012 presidential race they were out in force. According to Wesleyan Media 
Project data, in presidential primaries since 2000, “fewer than 15% of all ads were 
aired by outside groups.” By contrast, “[i]n 2012, this share skyrocketed to nearly 
60%” (Knight Foundation 2012). From December 1, 2011 through Election Day, 
November 6, 2012, independent expenditure groups spent over $360 million1 on 
presidential television advertising alone.2 By some estimates more than $1 billion 
1 Excluding money spent by the Democratic National Committee (DNC) which sponsored its 
ads with Obama for America and the Republican National Committee (RNC), spending totaled 
$361,641,510.
2 Source: Kantar Media CMAG.
Brought to you by | University of Pennsylvania
Authenticated | 128.91.58.254
Download Date | 4/21/14 8:52 PM
Messages, Micro-targeting, and New Media Technologies      431
was spent by third-party groups in 2012, “about triple the amount in 2010” (New 
York Times 2012). This wash of dollars purchased unprecedented levels and pro-
portions of independent expenditure advertising (Franz 2013). Since the upswing 
in third party content is likely to continue, this shift in placement means that 
the new technologies will probably carry increasing amounts of unaccountable, 
deceptive attack.
That prospect is problematic because representative government requires that 
voters be able to learn about the candidates who seek elective office. As Madison 
noted in his 1798 report to the General Assembly of Virginia on the Sedition Act, 
“The right of electing the members of the government constitutes more particu-
larly the essence of a free and responsible government. The value and efficacy 
of this right depends on the knowledge of the comparative merits and demerits 
of the candidates for public trust, and on the equal freedom, consequently, of 
examining and discussing these merits of the candidates respectively” (in Elliot 
2006). Indeed, in their discussions of what would become the First Amendment, 
the founders considered giving citizens the power to bind the votes of their repre-
sentatives (see debate on August 15, 1789).
From the infamous midnight flyers or handbills that in the pre-broadcast 
age contained the most scurrilous attacks (Jamieson 1984, 1992), to the “Horton 
ads” of the broadcast era, third-party ads have increased the amount of deceptive 
content parlayed to the public – a tendency likely to become more pronounced 
now that advertisers’ messages are able to infiltrate iPods and iPads without 
passing through channels of mass access. In many elections past the most inac-
curate and most controversial ads have been sponsored by just the kind of pseu-
donymous third party groups whose numbers and budgets set records in 2012. So 
for example, in 1988 the infamous “Willie Horton” ad by the National Security 
Political Action Committee harbored more deceptive statements and invited a 
greater number of false inferences than did the Bush campaign-sponsored “Fur-
lough” one (see Jamieson 1992; Jamieson and Waldman 2003). In 2004, the Swift 
Boat Veterans for Truth ads provoked a cascade of critiques from the fact checkers 
unrivalled by the response to any other ads.
In 2012 both the pro-Romney and pro-Obama groups violated the expec-
tations raised by Madison. In the primary period, the pro-Romney super PAC 
“Restore Our Future” led the list in both dollars spent on ads containing at least 
one deception and in the proportion of its ads containing at least one claim 
judged problematic by the fact checkers. In the post-primary period, the pro-
Obama super PAC spent more on ads harboring at least one suspect allegation 
than did the other third-party groups. The most controversial message posted by 
Priorities USA implied that Romney bore responsibility for the death of a woman 
whose husband had been laid off by a firm owned by Bain Capital. Not to be 
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outdone, a pro-Romney group’s web ad alleged that the Affordable Care Act taxed 
heart attacks, puppies, and babies. In 2012, Winneg et al. (in press) found that 
more than a fifth of the dollars spent by the top third party groups purchased 
ads containing at least one claim judged misleading by independent fact check-
ers. The likelihood that deceptive content will shift opinions increases when its 
volume is higher than that of counter-advertising, a situation more likely when 
content is micro targeted.
Third party advertising tends to carry a higher level of attack than candidate 
messaging as well. When it is fair, accurate and relevant to governance, attack 
is a part of healthy debate and indispensable to candidate evaluation (Jamieson 
1992). Problems occur however when attack displaces the advocacy needed to give 
voters a reason to vote for a candidate rather than simply against an opponent 
and when there is too little advocacy to permit voters to learn about the promises 
and plans that tie campaigning to governance. Although the evidence is mixed 
(Goldstein and Freedman 2002), some research suggests that high levels of attack 
may also demobilize target groups (Ansolabehere et al. 1994; Ansolabehere and 
Iyengar 1995).
Historically, the weaker the association between an ad and the candidate, 
the greater the likelihood that it will both attack and mislead. So, for example, in 
1996 the level of attack in the presidential campaign ads was higher in the Demo-
cratic National Committee ads than in the Clinton-Gore ones. In 2004 the level 
was higher in the progressive third-party ads than in the Kerry-Edwards ones; at 
the same time, the Swift Boat Veterans for Truth ads contained a higher level of 
attack than those sponsored by the Bush-Cheney campaign. In 2008 the third-
party ads by groups supporting McCain featured a higher level of attack than did 
those aired by his campaign itself. Consistent with that history, the Wesleyan 
data suggest that in 2012 “[f]ully 85% of ads sponsored by non-party organiza-
tions were purely negative, and another 10% were contrasting, leaving only 5% 
positive…. Party-sponsored ads, including coordinated expenditures, were also 
predominantly negative; 51.1% purely negative with only 11.5% positive. Candi-
dates, although they aired more positive ads than the groups or parties, were also 
largely negative in their advertising” (Fowler and Ridout 2013).
When third parties mask their messengers behind nondescript names such 
as Priorities USA or Americans for Prosperity, they make it impossible for audi-
ences and more difficult for reporters to factor the source into assessment of the 
message. Because sources with low ethos are by all accounts less persuasive than 
those that have earned wide respect, the masking process forestalls inferences 
that undercut the persuasiveness of messages (Andersen and Clevenger 1963; 
Berlo, Lemert, and Mertz 1969). Misdirecting self-identifications also thwart the 
ability of low information voters to draw generally reliable inferences about the 
Brought to you by | University of Pennsylvania
Authenticated | 128.91.58.254
Download Date | 4/21/14 8:52 PM
Messages, Micro-targeting, and New Media Technologies      433
self-interest of sponsoring groups (Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1991; Popkin 
1994; Lupia and McCubbins 1998).
Where ads carried in broadcast or cable channels can now be tracked by 
groups such as Kantar-CMAG, no comparable process exists to enable reporters 
and scholars to reliably intercept narrowcast information on the internet. As a 
result we do not know the characteristics of the targeted messages that the Inter-
active Advertising Bureau reported accounted for between $130 million and $200 
million in ad spending during the 2012 presidential election (Tsukayama 2013). 
When reporters are able to locate ads, they can both hold them accountable for 
deception and, in the case of pseudonymously sponsored ones, try to unmask 
the funder. So, for example, during the prescription drug benefit debate, news 
accounts revealed that “United Seniors Association” was backed by the pharma-
ceutical industry and, in 2012, Americans for Prosperity, funded in part at least by 
the Koch brothers. Voters who are aware of the identity of the funder can then add 
to their evaluation of the message such press-provided information as the fact 
that one of the Koch companies merited a large civil penalty “for its role in more 
than thirty oil spills in 2000” (Mayer 2013).
Where does all of this leave us? Contrary to The New Yorker cartoon in which 
no one on the internet knows you are a dog, in the politics of 2016 – in which 
randomized A/B testing enables advertisers, in Karpf’s words, “to optimize every 
element” of an “online communication strategy”– messengers reaching out to 
swing voters will not only know that you are not a dog but also that you are a size 
10, 36 year old white married pro-choice female mother of three children under 
18 who is a vegetarian, reads the New York Times, shops at Costco, reliably votes, 
drives a Prius, watches Good Wife and CBS News and has clicked on an internet 
ad of their campaign’s at least once. If that voter receives internet messages pro-
claiming that the Republican in the race opposes stem cell research, and that 
information is inaccurate, how will she know? When such a scenario played out 
in 2008 in micro-targeted radio, the fact-checkers spotted and debunked the false 
attack on John McCain. Had the same misinformation reached our hypothetical 
swing voter in 2008 only over the web, those reporters may well not have known 
that it existed.
Implications for Future Research
The lessons of elections past teach that campaign messages made memorable by 
third-party money can increase the level of un-rebutted deceptive attack while 
at the same time diminishing both the audience’s capacity to factor a message’s 
source into its assessment of message and the press’s capacity to unmask decep-
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tion and reveal sponsors’ self-interests. In the process these often pseudonymous 
messages can, to take a few liberties with Madison’s words, alter “the essence of a 
free and responsible government” by circumscribing the citizenry’s “knowledge 
of the comparative merits and demerits of the candidates for public trust” and its 
ability to examine and discuss the merits of the candidates.
In a world of micro-targeted messaging, it is difficult for reporters and schol-
ars to know who is saying what to whom, where and with what effect. In the 
absence of such information, journalists’ ability to hold sources accountable is 
even more circumscribed than when pseudonymous groups broadcast their mes-
sages in places open to public view. And without knowing what is being whis-
pered to whom, scholars have no good way to determine what effects, if any, this 
new form of campaigning is having on the candidates, the voters and the process 
writ large. If they are to subject micro-targeted campaign messages to their own 
“culture[s] of testing,” as they should, scholars and reporters need to achieve 
their own “analytics-based tactical optimization.” Doing so in both communities 
should be a priority.
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